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The ability to regulate and subsequently change behavior is influenced by both reflective
and implicit processes. Traditional theories have focused on conscious processes
by highlighting the beliefs and intentions that influence decision making. However,
their success in changing behavior has been modest with a gap between intention
and behavior apparent. Dual-process models have been recently applied to health
psychology; with numerous models incorporating implicit processes that influence
behavior as well as the more common conscious processes. Such implicit processes
are theorized to govern behavior non-consciously. The article provides a commentary on
motivational and volitional processes and how interventions have combined to attempt
an increase in positive health behaviors. Following this, non-conscious processes are
discussed in terms of their theoretical underpinning. The article will then highlight
how these processes have been measured and will then discuss the different ways
that the non-conscious and conscious may interact. The development of interventions
manipulating both processes may well prove crucial in successfully altering behavior.
Keywords: self-regulation, implicit, conscious, non-conscious, dual-process
CONSCIOUS PROCESSES IN BEHAVIOR CHANGE
The dominant theories within health psychology aim to predict and explain behavior in order
to guide the construction of interventions (Michie et al., 2009). A theoretical understanding is
important, particularly as interventions based on theory are more likely to be eﬀective (Michie and
Johnston, 2012). With a focus on conscious, reﬂective processes, these cognitive models introspect
attitudes, risk perceptions, and beliefs (Bandura, 1989; Ajzen, 1991; Schwarzer, 2008), typically
through self-report. Such processes are theorized to encompass motivation which subsequently
leads to the development of a behavioral intention. Thus, intention mediates the eﬀect of
motivation on behavior. Although studies have found that expectancy-value models, such as
the Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB: Ajzen, 1985), predict intention well (McEachan et al.,
2011), there is still a large proportion in behavior left unexplained (Armitage and Conner, 2001).
Unfortunately, the use of correlational data, which insuﬃciently validates a theory (Weinstein,
2007), far outweighs the number of studies attempting to change these processes through the
development of interventions (Hardeman et al., 2002). This is despite the prevalence of clear
methodological guidelines on belief alteration (Ajzen, 1991). Of those that have done so, however,
successful motivational manipulations have not resulted in actual change (Sniehotta, 2009), thus
suggesting people are generally motivated but struggle to transfer these positive intentions into
action (Chatzisarantis and Hagger, 2005). Theoretical and methodological issues have been oﬀered
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to explain the intention-behavior gap such as intention stability,
lack of volitional control, and poor study design (Sheeran and
Abraham, 2003; Ajzen, 2015). There are diﬀerent explanations
as to why individual’s fail at completing their previously stated
intentions. Such explanations include forgetting, distraction,
conﬂict, procrastination, action initiation, and control (Orbell
et al., 1997;Webb and Sheeran, 2006; Gollwitzer, 2015). Crucially,
such reasons go beyond processes of motivation.
SELF-REGULATION AND PLANNING
The transfer of motivation into action is dependent heavily
on one’s ability to self-regulate. Self-regulation is the ability to
overcome obstacles, get back on track, and ward oﬀ distractions
from tempting stimuli (Baumeister et al., 1994). Thus, possessing
such regulatory skills is crucial in fostering the enactment
of a previously stated intention. Proceeding the motivational
phase of behavior, action implementation occurs during the
volitional phase of striving. As such, self-regulation is important
during the phase of volition, with its purpose to facilitate
positive motivational states. Goal-setting techniques and raising
an individual’s level of self-eﬃcacy are ways to regulate conscious
processes. For example, a high belief in behavioral achievement
will determine how one recovers from set-backs and thus
decreases the chances of becoming derailed (Bandura, 1989).
One of the widely used strategies to facilitate self-regulation
involves planning (Schwarzer, 2008). One type of planning is
implementation intentions (Gollwitzer, 1999), which consists of
precise descriptions of critical situations in which to perform a
target behavior in terms of ‘if/then’ speciﬁcations (Gollwitzer,
1999). Such plans create a strong aﬃliation between a situational
cue and the goal-directed behavior, so that this planned behavior
may be triggered and initiated automatically when the cue
signaling the speciﬁed situation is encountered. It is argued that
intentions do not directly induce actions, but that they lead to
highly speciﬁc plans, which in turn prompt action initiation
(Gollwitzer, 1999). A similar strategy is action planning which
is often erroneously conﬂated with implementation intentions,
but includes more detail in the planning content (Hagger and
Luszczynska, 2014). Included within the post-intentional stage
of the Health Action Process Approach (Schwarzer, 2008),
action planning involves precise speciﬁcations of ‘when,’ ‘where,’
and ‘how’ behavior will be performed. In addition to action
planning, coping plans can also be used to facilitate self-
regulation by identifying potential inhibitors and barriers to
behavior (Sniehotta et al., 2005). Although action and coping
plans have convergent validity, it is best to treat them as two
separate strategies (Schwarzer, 2016). More speciﬁcally, as one
can only identify potential obstacles when the behavior is ﬁrst
imagined, action plans precede coping plans.
MOTIVATION AND VOLITION
Due to the importance of motivational and volitional processes
in changing behavior, researchers have combined the two within
interventions. White et al. (2012) successfully increased physical
activity within chronic disease suﬀerers by targeting identiﬁed
motivational beliefs from the TPB alongside planning strategies.
French et al. (2012) found increases in walking behavior in a
combined TPBmotivation and volition intervention compared to
those targeting motivation and volition separately. Studies have
also used planning strategies with other theories of motivation to
successfully change behavior including the ProtectionMotivation
Theory (e.g., Milne et al., 2002; Zhang and Cooke, 2012), and the
decisional balance sheet (e.g., Prestwich et al., 2003).
Although such work has been useful, a gap between planning
and behavior has also been identiﬁed (Sniehotta, 2009), thus
suggesting the presence of other mediators and moderators.
This gap has been addressed through the recent integration
of preparatory behaviors (Barz et al., 2016) and action control
(Fernández et al., 2016). Preparatory behaviors are those formed
a priori to the behavior, thus act as a sub-goal (Barz et al., 2016).
Action control refers to the monitoring and evaluation of action
with respect to the behavior (Fernández et al., 2016). Preparatory
behaviors, like planning strategies, are prospective routes to
change; whereas action control involves concurrent strategies.
In placing these two strategies as moderators, that is planning
is facilitated by the identiﬁcation of preparatory behaviors and
implementation of action control, other moderators may also
inﬂuence their success such as self-eﬃcacy (Bandura, 1989)
and cognitive resource depletion (Baumeister et al., 2007). For
example, Barz et al. (2016) found preparatory behaviors to be
more useful for those with less eﬃcacy beliefs. That is, the transfer
of positive intentions via planning and preparatory behaviors was
more prevalent in those who didn’t believe in their abilities.
In summary, it can be suggested that motivation results in
the formation of a behavioral intention, which can lead to the
development of volitional strategies such as action and coping
plans. The identiﬁcation of preparatory behaviors alongside
action control then facilitates the transfer of these plans into
action. The inclusion of volitional strategies can therefore
signiﬁcantly assist self-regulation.
NON-CONSCIOUS PROCESSES
Aside from conscious processes and planning approaches, recent
interest within health models of behavior change concerns the
inclusion of implicit processes (Sheeran et al., 2013). Such
processes operate at the non-conscious level without awareness,
and are seen as being relatively automatic and fast. As such, it is
argued that processes of which popular models of cognition such
as the TPB target, are insuﬃcient to explain and change behavior
(Sniehotta et al., 2014), with the lack of explanatory power a
resultant of processes such theories fail to take into consideration.
The ability to self-regulate and thus enact behaviormay be heavily
dependent on implicit processes.
MEASURING THE IMPLICIT
Despite the ease of which reﬂective processes can be assessed
using self-report measures, it is far more diﬃcult to measure
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implicit processes since individuals may not be able to
accurately reﬂect such processes (Hagger et al., 2015). Implicit
processes have been typically measured using the Go/No-Go
Association Task (Nosek and Banaji, 2001), aﬀective priming task
(Klauer and Musch, 2003), and the Implicit Association Test
(IAT; Greenwald et al., 1998). Such measures prevent socially
desirable responses often found in self-report. Concerning the
IAT, which is probably the most common, participants are
presented with a set of stimulus on a computer which they
then classify into one of two categories through the use of
a key press. The response latencies are used to calculate
implicit preferences. One problem with this measure is that it
requires the use of opposite stimuli and there is no obvious
dichotomy for certain behaviors, such as physical activity
(Rebar et al., 2015). Moreover, it is unclear whether the test
reveals a preference for a stimulus over another or a dislike
for a stimulus over the alternative (Blanton et al., 2006).
For example, does an individual prefer healthy foods more
than unhealthy foods, or is their distaste for unhealthy foods
more prevalent than their love for healthy foods. The Single-
Category Implicit Association (Karpinski and Steinman, 2006),
which only has one target category, has been developed to
address this problem. Other concerns refer to the speciﬁcity of
implicit measures and its internal validity. The TPB assesses
reﬂective beliefs speciﬁed at the target, action, context, and
time (TACT), whereas non-conscious measures appear to
provide assessments on a broader level (Perugini and Richetin,
2011). Furthermore, response latencies may be a product of
physical ability; not cognitive processes (Jaccard and Blanton,
2006).
DUAL PROCESS THEORIES
The relationship between implicit and explicit processes can
be framed using a variety of dual-processing models. On
the whole, these models describe one level of processing
that is deliberate and requires reﬂection, and another
level of processing that is implicit, automatic and requires
minimal cognitive resources. However, these deﬁnitions vary
and have been mixed depending on the theoretical stance
taken. For example, according to Hollands et al. (2016),
non-conscious behavior can be ascribed to situations when
the causal link between a stimulus and the behavior is not
recognized, thus implying consciousness is not automatic
and is under individual control. This sense of authorship
may be illusionary (Wegner, 2002), however, as a strong
subjective sense of a causal role isn’t suﬃcient to attribute
causation (Bargh, 2008). In terms of the models, just
like the plethora of change theories identifying reﬂective
processes, a similar pattern has emerged integrating both
types of processes. More speciﬁcally, these theories oﬀer
diﬀering interactions between the processes, resulting in a
confused understanding of the two (Payne and Gawronski,
2010). Understanding how the two processes interact




It is important to identify the role that the non-conscious
plays in behavior change and self-regulation as this has
important implications for intervention design. Papies (2016a)
suggests that cues do not aﬀect behavior directly, but do so
by activating cognitive structures that have been formed by
previous experiences in similar situations. Thus, there is a
mediation of implicit processes, with the activation of implicit
structures or schemata signiﬁcant. This poses the question of how
diﬃcult such processes are to change as a consequence of prior
learning and experiences (Wilson et al., 2000). If features of the
situation can be changed so that they alter which of a person’s
associations stored in memory becomes activated (Strack and
Deutsch, 2004), this would provide avenues for target. Similarly,
if such measures represent implicit processes responding to the
environment, these external inﬂuencers can be used to target
behavior via these processes. Of note here are prior situated
conceptualizations and their interactions with environmental
stimuli. If the environment is producing change wholly, the
individual could be viewed as a blank state, ‘tabula rasa’ known
to the behaviorists. An implicit change would, in turn, produce
similar responses in each individual (Payne and Gawronski,
2010). Thus, there is a tension between whether processes are
representative of the individual or their environment (Payne
and Gawronski, 2010). Due to the processes generated from
prior experiences, such a conclusion is unlikely. What is more
likely is the activation of implicit processes, resulting in implicit
processes that are still amendable to change (Gawronski and
Bodenhausen, 2006). As the mere perception of objects activates
stored memory associations (Hall and Fong, 2007), priming
can be used to manipulate desired responses (Bargh et al.,
2012). Such priming inﬂuences have been discussed recently by
Papies (2016b). Planning can also be used to prime positive
behavior. That is, when the situation is encountered, the cue
enacts the behavior automatically (Gollwitzer and Brandstätter,
1997).
In addition to focusing on what is automatically activated
through external aﬀects, attention can be placed on how people
respond to the stimuli. Such a process parallels the procedures
involved in reﬂective models such as Cognitive Behavioral
Therapy (CBT) whereby responses to automatic conscious
processes bear the focus of intervention (Ellis, 1957; Beck, 1964).
Changing how an individual responds to implicit processes can
be done in a number of ways such as evaluative conditioning
(Levey and Martin, 1975), approach/avoidance training (AAT;
Chen and Bargh, 1999), Attention Bias Modiﬁcation Treatment
(ABMT; MacLeod et al., 2002), and mindfulness (Segal et al.,
2002). Following the ideas of classical conditioning (Pavlov,
1927), evaluative conditioning refers to changes in liking or
disliking that are due to the pairing of stimuli (De Houwer, 2007).
AAT involves multiple trials wherein participants are taught to
overcome automatic action tendencies by learning to approach
one class of stimuli and avoid its counterpart. ABMT weakens
attentional responses by substituting the anticipated stimulus
with a neutral one (Sheeran et al., 2013). Within mindfulness,
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attention shifts from the content of thoughts and feelings to
the experience encountered within the present moment (Baer
et al., 2006). Thus, in comparison to the challenging and
realignment of maladaptive thoughts apparent within CBT, the
aim of mindfulness is a refocus of awareness, which decreases the
inﬂuence of implicit processes. Responses to unwanted inﬂuences
can also be controlled using plans (Gollwitzer et al., 2011).
Furthermore, coping plans can be used to prevent the urge of
implicit processes overriding conscious processes by intervening
between responses. Speciﬁcally, precise descriptions of coping
mechanisms automatically activate and trigger responses to
decrease the unhelpful behaviors’ inﬂuence. In all of these
approaches, the individual regains a sense of volition over





In addition to the inﬂuence of implicit processes, reﬂective
processes also have a role to play in behavior. The development of
the reﬂective system, which is seen as evolutionary new, performs
certain tasks that the non-conscious cannot (Baumeister and
Bargh, 2014). As stated earlier, the exact relation between the
processes varies within each dual model. The following are
potential interactions and their impact on behavior.
Both processes can inﬂuence behavior independently or
act as moderators (i.e., the inﬂuence of the non-conscious
is moderated by consciousness or the inﬂuence of conscious
processes is moderated by the non-conscious) (Rebar et al., 2016).
The limited space allocated for consciousness is facilitated by
the implicit processes triggered automatically whilst providing
adaptive responses to the environment (Baumeister and Bargh,
2014). Reﬂective processes may develop an intention and,
once repeatedly linked with a stimulus, become under the
guidance of the non-conscious through automatic activation
(Gardner, 2015). Thus, once activated, action is induced
through non-conscious processes instead of prior reﬂective states
(Gardner, 2015). Targeting intention and habits may therefore
be fruitful (Allom et al., 2016). Automatic processing may
be the default mode, guiding behavior in accordance with
one’s implicit attitudes unless an individual is prompt into
deliberation (Evans and Stanovich, 2013). When motivation
and opportunity is high, reﬂective processes may be in
control compared to the automated inﬂuences when such
motives and opportunity are low (Fazio, 1990). Due to its
ﬁnite resource and susceptibility to depletion, a weakened
cognitive state could hand self-control over to non-conscious
processes despite having motivation and opportunity (Friese
et al., 2009). Engaging in persistent decision making, complex
experiences, and constant restraints is likely to drain the
battery of self-control (Baumeister et al., 2007), leading to
mental contamination (Wilson and Brekke, 1994). Tempting,
unhealthy hedonic outcomes may be in contrast with the
reﬂective, healthier outcomes (Strack and Deutsch, 2004).
Aﬀective attitudes, distinct from instrumental processes, could
be seen as implicit routes to behavior (Conner et al., 2011).
Such aﬀective beliefs have been found to better predict short-
term choices compared to instrumental beliefs governing long-
term outcomes (Morris et al., 2016). Thus, prior positive
long-term motivational intentions developed from the careful
consideration of behavioral pros and cons could be overridden
in the wake of aﬀective outcomes. Finally, in utilizing a
neurobiological approach, the inﬂuence of intentions on behavior
can be moderated by executive function and behavioral
prepotency (Hall and Fong, 2015). Those possessing higher
inhibitory ability are more likely to suppress and inhibit
urges and thus enable control to remain in the reﬂective
system.
Although their relation is manifold, what is clear is the
stronger the inﬂuence of the non-conscious, the more one
has to consciously overcome it (Bargh, 2014). The tug-of-
war between the processes, encapsulated well within the horse
rider metaphor (Friese et al., 2011), determines whether the
reﬂective or implicit prevails (Hofmann et al., 2008). The
strength of the competing schemas resulting from boundary
conditions will determine the ‘winner’ (Strack and Deutsch,
2004). Although the concordance between implicit and explicit
processes in health psychology remains unclear and some
assert that reﬂective processes still account for implicit factors
through mediation (e.g., Jaccard and Blanton, 2006; Ajzen and
Dasgupta, 2015), research hasmoved from simply acknowledging
non-conscious existence to examining their interactions and
the situations that inﬂuence diﬀerent responses (Hagger,
2016).
CONCLUSION
Although research in behavior change has primarily concerned
conscious processes, it is important to account for implicit
processes in addition to its more common reﬂective counterpart.
Such inﬂuences oﬀer an explanation as to why there appears
to be a signiﬁcant gap between what one intends to do
and what is actually performed, thus taps into problems of
self-regulation. Despite the inclusion of implicit processes in
several theories of behavior change, there remains a lack of
eﬀective interventions (Hollands et al., 2016). Due to the
rapid progression in establishing a science of behavior change
(Michie et al., 2008), linking techniques with determinants of
change (Michie and Abraham, 2004) and establishing which
combine best to facilitate change (Michie et al., 2009) would
prove valuable. The number of techniques required could be
of particular use (Dombrowski et al., 2012); speciﬁcally as
diﬀerent techniques are needed to change the diﬀerent processes.
Although there are concerns surrounding intervention delivery
and reporting (Michie and Prestwich, 2010; Dombrowski et al.,
2016), interventions and techniques should be included within
the taxonomies currently dominated by reﬂective processes
(Sheeran et al., 2013). Such additions may satisfy recent
criticisms of popular reﬂective theories (e.g., Sniehotta et al.,
2014).
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